主题：Learning by Consuming: Sequential Screening with Endogenous Information Provision
主讲：郭汇一，Texas A&M University
We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism, in which a seller sells one unit of a divisible good to a buyer in two stages. In stage one, the buyer can rely on his private, rough valuation of the good to determine his first-stage consumption level. Consuming more leads to a more precise private valuation estimate of the good in stage two, after which he determines his second-stage consumption level. Since the single-crossing condition fails, the monotonicity in allocation plus the envelope condition are not sufficient for global incentive compatibility. The optimum is a menu of contracts, consisting of a first-stage price-quantity pair and a second-stage per-unit price for the remaining quantity. A larger first-stage quantity is paired with a higher first-stage price but a lower second-stage per- unit price. In equilibrium, a higher first-stage valuation buyer pays more to have higher first-stage consumption and enjoys a lower second-stage price.
郭汇一，Texas A&M University经济学助理教授。University of Iowa经济学博士。主要研究领域为微观经济学，机制设计等。有多篇论文发表于Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Micro, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory等国际期刊。