Theme：Learning by Consuming: Sequential Screening with Endogenous Information Provision

Lecturer：Huiyi Guo，Texas A&M University

Time：2022.05.19 10:00

Site：Tecent meeting 538-579-699

  Abstract:

  We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism, in which a seller sells one unit of a divisible good to a buyer in two stages. In stage one, the buyer can rely on his private, rough valuation of the good to determine his first-stage consumption level. Consuming more leads to a more precise private valuation estimate of the good in stage two, after which he determines his second-stage consumption level. Since the single-crossing condition fails, the monotonicity in allocation plus the envelope condition are not sufficient for global incentive compatibility. The optimum is a menu of contracts, consisting of a first-stage price-quantity pair and a second-stage per-unit price for the remaining quantity. A larger first-stage quantity is paired with a higher first-stage price but a lower second-stage per- unit price. In equilibrium, a higher first-stage valuation buyer pays more to have higher first-stage consumption and enjoys a lower second-stage price.

  Introduction to the lecturer：

  Huiyi Guo is assistant professor of economics at Texas A&M University. Doctor of Economics, University of Iowa. His research interests include microeconomics and mechanism design. Many papers have been published in international journals such as Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Micro, Games and Economic Behavior, and Economic Theory.