Abstract：

This paper studies majoritarian reputational bargaining. Three agents bargain over the division of one dollar under majority rule, and proposers are randomly chosen. Each agent has private information about whether she is a rational type that maximizes her expected share of the dollar or an obstinate type that commits to claiming a certain share of the dollar. Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian rep-utational bargaining may differ from their counterparts in bilateral reputational bargaining. In a particular equilibrium of our majoritarian game, efficiency loss vanishes asymptotically as the agents become patient, and bargaining ends immediately if all agents are rational. Moreover, the agent who has the lowest positive ex ante probability of being obstinate achieves the highest ex ante payoff, when such probabilities for all agents are sufficiently low.

Keywords:Reputational bargaining; Legislative bargaining

该文在线发表于《Journal of Economic Theory》2023年6月，该期刊为武汉大学经济与管理学院学术期刊分级方案A级奖励期刊。

原文链接：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105649