题目：Unobserved Ties between Corporate Executives and Mutual Fund Managers

　　报告人：凌崚，Georgia College & State University，副教授

　　时间：2017年6月16日(周五)9:30~11:00

　　地点：经管院B226

　　报告摘要如下：

　　We examine investment decisions made by mutual fund managers following the removal of corporate executives from an origin firm for positions at a new destination firm. Our results indicate that managerial turnover causes some funds to comigrate, i.e., divesting in the origin firm while initiating investments in the destination firm. This phenomenon is more pronounced for funds that have earned superior returns from the investments in the origin firm, and that have a greater demand for additional sources of information regarding the destination firm. Further, compared to the holding changes of non-comigration funds, the holding changes of comigration funds in the destination firm have more explanatory power for stock performance around earnings announcement dates. We found no evidence, however, that managers of co-migration funds have better investment skills than non-comigrating managers. Our findings indicate that institutional investors have comparative advantages in collecting certain types of information through connections with corporate executives.

　　报告人简介：

　　凌崚博士，美国Georgia College & State University金融学终身副教授。研究领域有机构投资者，共同基金，和公司金融等。1995年获武汉大学经济学学士 (国际金融)学位，2002年获美国Georgia State University(佐治亚州立大学)工商管理硕士(金融学) 学位，2008年获Georgia State University博士(金融学) 学位。所著论文发表在The Review of Financial Studies, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Journal of Financial Markets, Finance Research Letters 等多家国外学术期刊。担任Financial Review, Journal of Economics and Business，Finance Research Letters 的匿名审稿人。