讲座题目：Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring灵活监控的动态合同

主讲人：戴亮 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

讲座时间：5月18日14:00

讲座地点：C366

讲座摘要：

We study a principal's joint design of optimal monitoring and compensation schemes to incentivize an agent by incorporating information design into a dynamic contracting framework. The principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent's continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent's effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.

我们通过将信息设计纳入动态合同框架，研究了委托人联合设计的最佳监控和补偿方案以激励代理人。委托人可以在寻求证实或反驳代理人努力的证据之间灵活地分配有限的监控能力，作为奖励或惩罚的基础。当代理人的持续价值较低时，委托人只寻求确认性证据。当它超过一个阈值时，委托人主要寻求相互矛盾的证据。重要的是，当且仅当代理人有足够的生产力时，他的努力才会持续。

主讲人简介：

Liang Dai is an Associate Professor of Economics at Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He obtained his Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University in 2015. His research focuses on applied microeconomic theory, and his work has been published in Journal of Economic Theory.

戴亮，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院经济学副教授。2015年在普林斯顿大学获得经济学博士学位。研究重点是应用微观经济理论，发表在Journal of Economic Theory上。