讲座题目：Profitability of Frequency Reward Programs（常客奖励计划的盈利性）

主讲人：V.Brian Viard   长江商学院

讲座时间：2025年04月24日10:00

讲座地点：学院440

讲座内容摘要：

We study the profitability of frequency reward programs under very general conditions. We begin by comparing the profitability of a monopolist offering a buy-X-get-one-free program to that of spot prices. The reward program can never outperform spot prices, even though they converge in the limit as X = +∞. This result is robust to a buy-X-get-Y-free program, flexible cost structures, credit-specific pricing, and most importantly, fully-flexible specifications of customer heterogeneity. We then consider a duopoly in which both firms choose simultaneously between offering a reward program and spot prices. The only Nash equilibrium is for both firms to offer spot prices. Finally, we show that a reward program can outperform spot prices if credits have finite expiration. We provide intuition and managerial implications of these results and reconcile previous findings of profit-enhancing reward programs.

我们研究了一般条件下的常客奖励计划的盈利性特征。首先，我们将垄断企业提供的"买X赠一"奖励计划的盈利水平与现价定价策略进行对比。研究结果表明：奖励计划无法超越现价定价的盈利水平，即使当X趋近于正无穷大时两者的盈利水平趋于收敛。这一结论对"买X赠Y"奖励计划、弹性成本结构、积分定向定价等情境下均稳健，最重要的是，其对客户异质性的各种设定依然成立。随后我们考察双寡头市场环境下企业同时在奖励计划与现价定价之间进行策略选择的博弈过程，发现唯一的纳什均衡是双方均采用现价定价。最后，我们证明当积分设置有限有效期时，奖励计划的盈利性可能优于现价定价。本文阐释了这些结论的经济学直觉与对经营管理实践的启示，并对现有文献中关于奖励计划提升盈利能力的发现提供了理论解释。

主讲人学术简介：

V.Brian Viard，长江商学院战略管理与经济学常聘副教授，芝加哥大学Booth商学院博士，研究领域为产业组织、环境经济学、应用微观、企业竞争战略等。2007年加入长江商学院前曾在斯坦福大学商学院任教。其研究论文发表在RAND Journal of Economics (2篇)、Economic Journal、Journal of Public Economics、Journal of Development Economics、AEJ: Microeconomics、Management Science、Quantitative Marketing and Economics等国际顶尖期刊上。