讲座题目：Information Sharing and Manufacturer Rebate Competition（信息共享与制造商返现竞争）

主讲人：王云阶  中国人民大学商学院

讲座时间：2025年03月21日14:00

讲座地点：学院119

讲座摘要：

我们研究了零售商在面对两个提供返现的竞争制造商时共享私有需求信息的动机。研究表明，零售商的信息共享动机取决于返现敏感型消费者的比例、竞争强度以及零售商是否能够通过共享信息收取额外费用。当零售商无法收取额外费用时，他不会自愿与垄断制造商共享信息，但在存在竞争的情况下，可能选择不共享、与其中一个或与两个制造商共享。值得注意的是，我们发现更激烈的竞争或更低的返现敏感型消费者比例，可能会通过促使零售商共享信息而使某一制造商受益。当零售商可以收取额外费用时，我们分析了他分别与制造商同时签约和顺序签约的两种情形。结果表明，零售商总是更偏好同时签约，因为这种方式能够实现系统最优的信息共享决策。

We investigate the incentive for a retailer to share private demand information with two rebate-offering manufacturers who sell substitutable products through the retailer. We show that the retailer’s incentive to share information depends on the proportion of rebate-sensitive consumers, the competition intensity, and whether the retailer can charge a side payment for sharing the information. When the retailer cannot charge a side payment, he will not voluntarily share information with a monopolistic manufacturer, but he may do so with none, one, or both of the manufacturers when there is competition. Interestingly, we find that more intense competition or a smaller proportion of rebate-sensitive consumers may benefit a manufacturer if it induces the retailer to share information with her. When the retailer can charge a side payment, we consider two cases: concurrent contracting and sequential contracting with the manufacturers for sharing the information. We show that the retailer always prefers concurrent contracting, which induces the system-optimal information sharing decision, over sequential contracting.

主讲人简介：

王云阶，现任中国人民大学商学院管理科学与工程系副教授。毕业于香港科技大学商学院，主要研究方向为供应链管理、平台经济与可持续运营。其研究成果发表于Management Science、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management等国际顶级期刊，多次入选ESI高被引论文。曾经或正在主持两项国家自然科学基金项目。