讲座题目：Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring（动态合约中的灵活监控）

主讲人：杨明 伦敦大学学院（UCL）

讲座时间：2024年12月12日14:30

讲座地点：学院206

讲座内容摘要：

We study a principal's joint design of optimal monitoring and compensation schemes to incentivize an agent. In an otherwise standard dynamic contracting framework, the principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent's continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent's effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.

我们研究了委托人在动态合约框架下，如何联合设计最优的监控和激励机制以激励代理人。在这一标准的动态合约模型中，委托人可以灵活地分配其有限的监控资源，用于寻找支持或反驳代理人努力的证据，以作为奖励或惩罚的依据。当代理人的延续价值较低时，委托人仅寻找支持性证据；当延续价值超过某一阈值时，委托人则主要寻找反驳性证据。重要的是，只有当代理人生产率足够高时，其努力才会得以持续。

主讲人学术简介：

YangMing, PhD in Economics, Princeton University; MSc in Economics, Tsinghua University; BSc in Mathematics, Nanjing University. Associate Professor of Economics and Finance, UCL; Associate Professor, Assistant Professor in Finance, Duke University. I work on various topics in finance, economics, and accounting, which features strategic information acquisition/disclosure, (mis-)coordination, security design, and (dynamic) contracting. My work includes papers published in the Review of Economic Studies, the Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, and the Journal of Accounting and Economics.

杨明，经济学博士（普林斯顿大学），经济学硕士（清华大学），数学学士（南京大学），现任伦敦大学学院（UCL）经济与金融学副教授，曾任杜克大学金融学副教授及助理教授。研究涵盖金融学、经济学与会计学多个领域，重点关注战略性信息获取与披露、（误）协调、证券设计及（动态）合约等主题。研究成果已发表在Review of Economic Studies、Review of Financial Studies、Journal of Economic Theory、Theoretical Economics和Journal of Accounting and Economics等学术期刊上。