讲座题目：The revelation principle with information networks（信息网络下的显示原理）

主讲人：谯涌川 中国电子科技大学管理与经济学院

讲座时间：2024年11月28日14:00

讲座地点：学院121

讲座内容摘要：

We study the revelation principle on information networks (digraphs) whereby agents have access to information that their neighbors have. We show, through an example, that the revelation principle may fail in the presence of networks. We provide a full characterization of the revelation principle in a framework of Bayesian games with communication under an information network structure---that is, any equilibrium of any Bayesian communication game with information network G can be represented by an incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism iff G is a transitive network (that is closed under the directed-link transitivity). This gives rise to a well-defined notion of G-communication equilibria, which is composed of a convex polyhedron of incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanisms under the information network structure. Our approach is applicable to a plethora of revelation principles discussed in the literature.

我们研究了在信息网络（有向图）中如何应用“揭示原则”，也就是当代理人能够获取其邻居所掌握的信息时，这一理论是否仍然成立。通过一个例子，我们发现，在某些情况下，当存在复杂的信息传播路径时，传统意义上的“揭示原则”可能无法适用。在此基础上，我们进一步提出了一种新的框架，用来描述具备贝叶斯博弈和通信特征的信息网络中的“揭示原则”。具体来说，当且仅当该信息网 G 满足传递性条件（即所有有向链路之间满足传递关系），任何与之关联的贝叶斯通信博弈都可以使用一种激励相容型、直接披露机制来实现。这一发现引入了一种叫做“G-通信均衡”的新概念，它由符合激励相容条件、基于该信息网结构的一系列直接披露机制所构成，并且这些机制形成了一个凸多面体。我们的研究方法还可推广到当前学术文献中广泛讨论的一系列“揭示原则”的应用场景。

主讲人学术简介：

Dr. Yongchuan Qiao is an associate Professor at the School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. He completed his Ph.D. at the National University of Singapore in 2017, and his major research interests are in game theory, microeconomic theory, information design, and network economics. He has published two papers in Journal of Economic Theory.

谯涌川博士，中国电子科技大学管理与经济学院副教授，2017年于新加坡国立大学获得博士学位。研究重点涵盖博弈论、微观经济学理论、信息设计以及网络经济学等领域，已在Journal of Economic Theory发表两篇论文。