讲座题目：Weight-Ranked Divide-and-Conquer Contracts（基于权重排序的分治合同设计）

主讲人：Lester Chan 南方科技大学

讲座时间：2024年11月07日14:00

讲座地点：学院119

讲座内容摘要：

This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all equilibrium selection criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and then induces them to accept their offers in a dominance-solvable way, starting from the first agent. I apply the general results to networks, public goods/bads, and a class of binary-action applications.

本文研究了一大类多代理人的合约模型，这些模型的特性是代理人的收益构成了一个加权位势博弈。由于代理人之间的策略互动，模型中可能会出现多个均衡。本文全面刻画了一种最优的合约设计方案，该方案适用于所有相较于位势最大化更加悲观的均衡选择标准。具体而言，该方案根据代理人在加权位势博弈中的权重将其升序排序，并通过逐步引导的方式促使代理人依次接受合同报价，从权重最低的代理人开始。本文将该一般性结果应用于网络、公共物品与公共坏物品的供给，以及一类二元选择模型。

主讲人学术简介：

Lester Chan is an Assistant Professor at Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech) Business School. Before that, he was an Assistant Professor in Economics at Xiamen University. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston University in 2021. His research interests are microeconomic theory and industrial organization, with a focus on contract theory, business economics, platforms, and potential games. He has published papers in The RAND Journal of Economics, Management Science, and Academy of Management Review.

Lester Chan是南方科技大学商学院的助理教授。在此之前，他曾任厦门大学经济学助理教授。他于2021年获得波士顿大学经济学博士学位，研究兴趣包括微观经济理论和产业组织，特别是合同理论、商业经济学、平台经济以及位势博弈。论文曾发表在The RAND Journal of Economics、Management Science、Academy of Management Review等期刊。