讲座题目：Myopic formation of networks

报告人：孙阳

报告时间：2021年5月19日（周三）下午14:00

报告地点：经管院A208

主办单位：武汉大学经济与管理学院数理经济与数理金融系

主持人：孙祥

内容摘要：We study the problem of designing network sequentially and myopically when agents play a complementary network game. In each period, the planner connects two unlinked agents in the network formed by previous stages to achieve the highest equilibrium welfare. We show that the network formation process is unique in the sense that the formed network is quasi-complete in each period regardless the strength of complementary effect. This result refines the predition of (globally) efficient network in the literature by discriminating nested split graphs. Finally, we show that when the strength of network effect is small and the total number of links is large, both myopically and globally efficent network is quasi-complete.

主讲人简介：孙阳，四川大学经济学院特聘副研究员，研究领域为博弈论、网络经济学。他的学术工作发表于Economic Theory，Economic Modelling等经济学重要期刊。