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经济学高级研究论坛第157期
时间:2021-04-23    点击数:

讲座题目:Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation

报告人:宋阳波

报告时间:2021年4月30日14:00

报告地点:经管院B249

主办单位:武汉大学经济与管理学院数理经济与数理金融系

主持人:Daehyun Kim

 

内容摘要We study adversarial information design in a regime-change context. A continuum of agents simultaneously choose whether to attack the current regime. The attack succeeds if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. A designer manipulates information about the regime's strength to maintain the status quo. Our optimal information structure exhibits local obfuscation: some agents receive a signal matching the regime's true strength, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. This policy is the unique limit of finite-signal problems. Public signals are strictly suboptimal, and in some cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation guarantees the collapse of agents' coordination.

 

主讲人简介:宋阳波,本科毕业于香港大学经济金融系,于加州大学洛杉矶分校获得经济学博士学位,现于香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院任助理教授。研究方向为博弈论、网络经济学和信息经济学,论文见于Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization等国际知名期刊。目前主要研究内容包括超模博弈中的信息设计,网络中的信息不对称与合约设计,意识局限对策略行为的影响等。