讲座题目：Self-Evident Events and the Value of Linking
摘要：We propose a theory of linking in long-term relationships that is based on the notion of self-evident event, which describes what becomes "public" at the end of a stage game where players observe both public and private information. We obtain a tight bound on the average per-period efficiency loss that must be incurred to enforce a stage-game outcome throughout a T-period repeated game when T is large. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They explain the inefficiency result in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), as well as the approximate-efficiency results in Compte (1998), Obara (2009), and Chan and Zhang (2016).
简介：本科毕业于北京大学，2006年毕业于新加坡国立大学，现任职上海财经大学经济学院，终身副教授。研究领域是微观经济学、博弈论。已在Journal of Economic Theory和Theoretical Economics等上发表论文数篇。