讲座题目：Mergers and Merger Waves under Incomplete information

报告人：从佳佳

报告时间：2019年11月30日上午10：00-11：20

报告地点：经管院B224

主办单位：珞珈青年经济与管理论坛

      经济学系

      数理经济与数理金融系

内容摘要：This paper studies how incomplete information affects firms' merger incentives and the likelihood of merger waves. We find mergers become strategic complements under incomplete information even if they are strategic substitutes under complete information. Total merger frequency and the likelihood of merger waves are very likely to increase under incomplete information. Compared with the scenario that no firm has private information, leading firms usually would like to pay to be informed. Following firms would always stay ignorant intentionally even if they can know demand information without any cost. Incomplete information tends to increase the joint profits of leaders and followers, but it hurts consumer surplus. Reducing information incompleteness in an industry enhances consumer surplus.

主讲人简介：从佳佳，2011年毕业于武汉大学经济学基地班，2018年获得香港大学产业经济与战略方向博士学位。研究兴趣集中于产业组织理论和应用微观经济学，具体包括企业并购和沉默持股、大数据对企业策略的影响等。研究成果发表于Management Science、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等刊物。