Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Asymmetric Information

2018-05-14

 TopicImitation and Intellectual Property Rights Policy under Asymmetric Information

  SpeakerSHAO Yucen   Nanjing University

  SiteB249

  Time10:00am, May 18, 2018

  AbstractThis paper uncovers that strengthening intellectual property right (IPR) protection in the South may be a win-win game for both northern and southern countries. IPR protection affects technology opportunities as well as imitation costs for the southern countries. Technology transfer normally carries on asymmetric information under different parties. Northern countries normally have more private information about their technologies, but southern countries could not. So asymmetric information will significantly influence southern countries’ strategy in dealing with imitation activities and IPR protection. In the equilibrium of this game with asymmetric information, optimal IPR policy will take a form in terms of an inverse U shape with regard to the imitation ability of southern countries; that is, optimal IPR protection will increase with the imitation ability and fall until a sufficiently high level of imitation ability. Our empirical analysis based on 116 countries over the years 2000-2012 supports this theoretical prediction and is robust to various specifications.