A network game of dynamic traffic

2018-04-16

        Speaker: Prof.CAO Zhigang(Beijing Jiaotong University)

¡¡¡¡Time£º14:00—15:30  April 26,2018

¡¡¡¡Site£ºEMS B226

¡¡¡¡Abstract£ºWe study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given priorities on edges (e.g., road segments). We first constructively prove that there always exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) in this game. We then study the relationship between this model and a simplified model, in which agents select and fix an origin-destination path simultaneously. We show that the set of Nash equilibrium (NE) flows of the simplified model is a proper subset of the set of SPE flows of our main model. We prove that each NE is also a strong NE and hence weakly Pareto optimal. We establish several other nice properties of NE flows, including global First-In-First-Out. Then for two classes of networks, including series-parallel ones, we show that the queue lengths at equilibrium are bounded at any given instance, which means the price of anarchy of any given game instance is bounded, provided that the inflow size never exceeds the network capacity. (joint work with Bo Chen, Xujin Chen, and Changjun Wang)