Multi-period Matching with Commitment
Speaker£ºDr ZHENG Jie(Tsinghua University)
Time£º15:30-17:00 April 10,2017(Monday)
Abstract£ºMany multi-period matching markets exhibit some level of commitment. That is, agents’ ability to terminate an existing relationship may be restricted by cost of breakups, binding contracts or social norms. This paper models matching markets with three types of commitment, defines corresponding notions of stability and examines the existence of stable mechanisms, as well as specifies sufficient conditions for efficiency, strategy-proofness and other properties. Firstly, the market with full commitment most closely resembles the static matching market, where most of the results, such as existence of stability, hold in the most general class of preferences. However, there is no dynamically stable spot rule, which only depends on spot markets, unless agents are extremely impatient. Secondly, for the models with two-sided commitment or one-sided commitment, desirable properties that are valid under the setup with a fixed set of individuals may not hold when arrivals and departures are introduced, and three approaches are proposed to deal with this issue. Whenever a dynamically stable matching exists, we construct an algorithm building upon the Deferred Acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) to characterize such a matching outcome. Moreover, as extensions, we discuss the case with no commitment and conduct welfare comparisons among cases with different types of commitment.