Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: Therole of neutral agents

Author:  PAN Min (Department of Finance) et all.
Publication:  Economics Letters£¬159£º10¨C14
Abstract:  The role of neutral agents on evolutionary tolerance between two differentiated groups is discussed basedon the replicator game model proposed recently.Weshow that, very different from the pure opposing casestudied previously, dynamics of social tolerance with neutral agents is more positive and exhibiting richinteresting effects. The full intolerance steady state (0, 0) is unstable when neutral agents are taken intoconsideration and there are two type of evolution trajectory according to the population of the neutralagents. Especially, phase trajectories reach to the stable full tolerance steady state (1, 1) at any startingpoint if the population of the neutral agents is large enough, and the tolerance between different socialgroups can be a natural consequence of economic integration in the present of neutral agents. We showthat neutral agents may remove the contradiction between the traditional idea of economic integrationand the evolutionary game point of view.

¡¡¡¡¡¾Keywords¡¿Replicator dynamics;Tolerance;Economic interaction model